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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORIC SCOPE AND USE IN THE
WATERGATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
HEARINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
Executive privilege is "a concept invoked by members of the executive
branch of the government to justify withholding evidence and other com-
municative materials from the legislative and judicial branches."' Since
the presidency of George Washington, the executive has attempted to
withhold information from the other two branches. 2
When the executive privilege has been asserted, it has always been in
the context of a larger inter-branch struggle for political power. The re-
sults of these assertions have not been uniform,3 and it is not presently
possible to define concretely the contours of the privilege.4
When presidents have asserted the executive privilege to obstruct judi-
cial proceedings, the judiciary has always prevailed. 5 The legislature, how-
ever, has been less successful in forcing revelation of particular executive
information.'
The purpose of this comment is to trace the historical development of
the executive privilege claim and to examine its use in the Watergate and
Environmental Protection Agency hearings. 7
II. FOUNDATIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
A. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
The separation of powers doctrine has been used as a basis for execu-
tive privilege claims.' Although this doctrine is not expressly stated in the
Constitution, it served as the theory which the founding fathers relied
upon to frame the Constitution.9 Reflecting the founders' "distrust for the
1. Note, Constitutional Law - Executive Privilege: Tilting the Scales in Favor of Se-
crecy, 53 N.C.L. REv. 419, 419 (1974).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 41-53, 57-72.
3. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 91, 128-37.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 41-50, 73-82.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
7. The Environmental Protection Agency hearings refer to the hearings held in 1982 by
the House Public Works Oversight Committee and House Oversight and Investigations Sub-
committee concerning misconduct in the management of the Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust Fund, 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (Supp. V 1981).
8. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
9. Gard, Executive Privilege: A Rhyme Without A Reason, 8 GA. L. REv. 809, 822 (1974).
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power inherent in government,"' 0 the concept of separation of powers
limits the power of the federal government and the branches of that gov-
ernment.1 The doctrine itself grants no powers, but rather protects the
powers granted in the Constitution." The doctrine is based upon a bal-
ance of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 13
The powers comprising the weights in the balance are provided by the
Constitution. 4
1. The Power of the Legislature
Congressional authority to demand information from the executive
branch arises from Congress' power to investigate. The Constitution gives
Congress the power to legislate, 5 and inherent in that power is the power
to investigate.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information-which not infrequently is true-recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.'
6
Although this inherent investigative power is recognized as being broad,
"it is not unlimited."'1 7 Any congressional investigation must be related to
current or future legislation or another legitimate task of Congress.' 8
Congress also has the authority to impeach 9 and to appropriate
funds.2" The power to investigate is inherent in both functions. Impeach-
10. Id.
11. Id. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to pro-
mote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was ... to save
the people from autocracy.").
12. Gard, supra note 9, at 823.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . ").
16. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 137, 175 (1927).
17. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (Congress' investigatory powers
include investigating the administration of existing laws, correcting defects in society, and
probing into government departments to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.).
18. Id. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1880) (a resolution authorizing
an investigation into a bankrupt company indebted to the United States exceeded the pow-
ers conferred by the Constitution); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957) (Con-
gress cannot expose information just for the sake of exposure); Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (the power to investigate must be supported by a valid legislative
purpose).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
20. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
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ment requires calling witnesses to answer questions,2 and appropriating
funds necessitates inquiring into the use made of previous allocations and
into the wisdom of spending programs.
22
Congress does not attempt to interfere with the performance of execu-
tive duties when requesting information.2 3 It simply tries to perform its
own duties, which require reviewing information relevant to a particular
situation.2 4 An absolute executive privilege would frustrate Congress in
the performance of its functions.
2. The Power of the Judiciary
The judiciary's authority to demand information from the executive
branch arises from its power under article III of the Constitution to adju-
dicate cases and controversies. 5 Implicit in this power is the authority to
issue process to obtain evidence. 26 Since the executive is not immune
from such process,27 there appears to be no basis for an absolute execu-
tive privilege from the judicial fact-finding process.
3. The Power of the Executive
Supporters of the executive privilege contend that the executive's
power to withhold information flows from the presidential powers found
in article II of the Constitution.28 Section 1 of article H provides that "the
executive power shall be vested in a President."'2 Arguments that execu-
tive privilege is implicit in this executive power are contrary to the found-
ing fathers' intention to have a government of limited, enumerated pow-
ers.'0 Although the President "is placed high and is possessed of power
far from being contemptible, .... not a single privilege is annexed to his
character .... "3'
The President's duty under article H, section 3 to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed"" 2 has been narrowly construed 3 and does
21. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 190.
22. Gard, supra note 9, at 826.
23. Comment, Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives and Recommenda-
tions, 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 692, 714 (1974).
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2.
26. Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383, 1384 (1974).
27. Id. at 1385.
28. Gard, supra note 9, at 827.
29. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
31. Cox, supra note 26, at 1391 (quoting statement by James Wilson to the Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention).
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
1983]
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not support an executive privilege. While it is recognized that the Presi-
dent has a vast range of discretion in executing the laws, there is no sup-
port for the idea that he may use his power to frustrate Congress' per-
formance of its constitutional duties. 4
Proponents of the executive privilege further contend that the power to
withhold information is inherent in the executive role.3 5 This assertion is
contrary to the intentions of the delegates to the Constitutional Conven-
tion to have a government of limited and enumerated powers,"8 with the
states or people retaining any powers not specifically granted to the gov-
ernment.3 7 The reluctance of the convention delegates to adopt the se-
crecy provision of article I, section 538 shows that they did not intend to
give the President an inherent power to withhold information.3 9 Addition-
ally, in The Steel Seizure Case,4 ° the Supreme Court refused to recognize
an inherent presidential power where the exercise of such power would
run contrary to the expressed will of Congress.
B. The Executive Privilege in Judicial Proceedings
The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison4 1 addressed the issue of a
constitutional privilege protecting confidential transactions and conversa-
tions between the President and his immediate subordinates. The Court
recognized the existence of an executive privilege,42 but at the same time
retained the authority to determine when the privilege could be
concurring) ("The power to execute the laws starts arid ends with the laws Congress has
enacted."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the
laws .... ").
34. Gard, supra note 9, at 829.
35. Id. at 830.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
37. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
38. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Se-
crecy ... ").
39. The secrecy provision was adopted by the founding fathers after they were assured it
would apply only to military secrets. See Berger, Executive Privilege V. Congressional In-
quiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 1043, 1067-68 (1965).
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). President Truman
asserted that he had the inherent power to protect "the well-being and safety of the Nation
.... " Id. at 584. The Supreme Court, in rejecting this assertion, stated that "[t]he Presi-
dent's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself." Id. at 585.
41. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (The Attorney General, who was Acting Secretary of
State under President Adams, was asked to supply information concerning whether commis-
sions had been signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of State.).
42. Id. at 144 (The Attorney General was not bound to reveal anything communicated to
him in confidence.).
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asserted.":
The Court's power to subpoena the President was articulated in Chief
Justice Marshall's first opinion in United States v. Burr.44 In his second
Burr opinion,45 Marshall recognized the existence of an executive privi-
lege to "withhold private letters of a certain description,"46 but never
specified the basis, scope, or method for determining the validity of the
privilege.47 Instead, it was the executive branch that recognized the judi-
ciary's authority to determine whether the information was privileged,48
thus making Burr of little value as precedent for an absolute executive
privilege.
Not until 1953, in United States v. Reynolds,49 was a determination of
the scope and validity of the executive privilege firmly delegated to the
courts. The Supreme Court stated: "The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege
... . Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to
the caprice of executive officers. '50 However, the Court still had not ar-
ticulated a method for determining the validity of an executive privilege
claim.5 1 The balancing test used by the lower federal courts52 was not
adopted by the Supreme Court until its decision in United States v.
Nixon.53
43. Id. at 144-45 (whether the commissions were in the office was not confidential, but
rather was "a fact which all the world [had] a right to know," and therefore must be
disclosed).
44. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
45. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). Chief Justice
Marshall's second opinion addressed the issue of whether a presidential claim of absolute
executive privilege based on confidentiality was an adequate response to a subpoena.
46. Id. at 191-92.
47. Note, supra note 1, at 424.
48. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 190. The government attorney stated, "The accuracy of this opin-
ion I am willing to refer to the judgment of the court, by submitting the original letter to its
inspection."
49. 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
50. Id. at 8-10.
51. The Court did state, however, that "[i]n each case, the showing of necessity which is
made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate." Id. at 11.
52. See, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 791
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ("the settled rule is that the court must balance the moving
party's need for the documents in the litigation against the reasons which are asserted in
defending their confidentiality"); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D.
318, 324 (1966) (The court weighed "the public concern in revelations facilitating the just
resolution of legal disputes, and ... public needs for confidentiality.").
53. 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
1983]
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C. The Executive Privilege in Legislative Proceedings
The first relevant legislative statement which dealt with a privilege to
withhold information from the legislative branch occurred in 1789 when
Congress enacted a statute providing that "[t]he Secretary of the Trea-
sury. . . shall make report and give information to either branch of the
legislature in person or in writing, as may be required, respecting all mat-
ters, referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which
shall appertain to his office. . .. -54 This statute has been interpreted to
apply to all cabinet members." It was the view of most early legislators
that government officials would obey congressional demands for
information.
56
Presidents have attempted to withhold information from Congress for a
variety of reasons. Presidents Jefferson, Monroe, Polk, and Grant with-
held information requested by Congress only where they believed the in-
formation could not be disclosed without harm to the public welfare.57
Any conclusions based upon these incidents must be narrow in scope be-
cause "[ilt cannot be presumed that the exercise of . . . discretion...
[by the President] in a case where it was conferred upon him, proves that
he would have exercised it in a case where it was not conferred. This
would be a somewhat violent presumption.""
During the Washington, Jackson, and Tyler administrations, each Pres-
ident challenged Congress' authority over the subject matter of requested
documents. President Washington, in voluntarily releasing the papers re-
quested by the Senate, did not base his initial refusal to comply on an
54. Gard, supra note 9, at 812 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, as
amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970) (emphasis added by Gard)).
55. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 333 (1856).
56. Gard, supra note 9, at 812.
57. Id. at 814-17. President Jefferson was asked to submit all information to the House
regarding the Burr conspiracy except that information which he felt the public welfare did
not require to be disclosed. Id. at 814-15 (citing 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 334, 336 (1806-07)). The
House asked President Monroe for information concerning the misconduct of naval officers.
The President's response suggests that the House only requested information which Presi-
dent Monroe thought was consistent with the public interest and justice to release. Cox,
supra note 26, at 1397 n.55 (citing 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 278 (J. Rich-
ardson ed. 1898)). President Polk was asked for information concerning Secret Service fund
disbursements. The President provided the House with complete information regarding ex-
penses, but refused, pursuant to a congressional authorization statute, to disclose the spe-
cific purposes for which the funds were expended. Gard, supra note 9, at 816 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 636-38 (1846)). President Grant refused to provide Congress
with information concerning executive acts performed away from the capitol. Only informa-
tion deemed compatible with the public interest to disclose was requested. Gard, supra note
9, at 817 (citing 9 CONG. REC. 2158 (1876)).
58. Gard, supra note 9, at 815 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 271, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. 13-14
(1843)) (emphasis in original).
208 [Vol. 18:203
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executive power to withhold information. s President Tyler refused to
provide Congress with information pertaining to subject matter exclu-
sively vested in the executive by the Constitution. Thus, these two inci-
dents cannot be equated with an absolute executive privilege. President
Jackson was the first to claim that the President has an inherent power to
withhold information from Congress."' He stated:
The Executive is a coordinate and independent branch of the Govern-
ment, equally with the Senate; and I have yet to learn under what constitu-
tional authority that branch of the legislature has a right to require of me
an account of any communication, either verbally or in writing made to the
heads of departments, acting as a cabinet council.62
President Jackson had many confrontations with Congress concerning the
withholding of information; he did not always prevail.6 3
In this century, President Truman responded to the McCarthy hearings
on alleged subversive activity within the executive branch by thwarting
all congressional investigations.6 4 The President's action prompted the
following response from then Congressman Richard Nixon:
The point has been made that the President of the United States has issued
an order that none of this information can be released to the Congress ....
I say that that proposition cannot stand from a constitutional standpoint or
on the basis of the merits for this very good reason: That would mean that
the President could have arbitrarily issued an Executive order in the Mey-
ers case, the Teapot Dome case, or any other case denying the Congress of
the United States information it needed to conduct an investigation of the
executive department and the Congress would have no right to question his
decision. 5
The McCarthy probe continued into the Eisenhower administration 6
and resulted in the first use of the term "executive privilege. 6 7 The even-
59. President Washington, relying on the President's treaty-making powers, refused to
furnish the House with documents disclosing instructions he gave to John Jay for negotiat-
ing the Jay Treaty. Gard, supra note 9, at 814 (citing 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 760-62 (1796)).
60. President Tyler refused, based on his power under article II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitu-
tion, to release the names of the members of the 26th and 27th Congresses who applied for
appointment to executive offices. Gard, supra note 9, at 816 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 27th
Cong., 2d Sess. 349 (1842)).
61. Gard, supra note 9, at 815. President Jackson refused to comply with a congressional
request for a paper which he read to department heads concerning the withdrawal of gov-
ernment deposits from the United States Bank.
62. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1833)).
63. See Wiggins, Government Operations and the Public Right to Know, 19 FED. B.J. 62,
80-81 (1959).
64. Gard, supra note 9, at 818.
65. 94 CONG. REc. 4783 (1948).
66. See Gard, supra note 9, at 819.
67. Schlesinger, Executive Privilege: A Murky History, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1973, at 8,
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tual abandonment of Senator McCarthy's subpoena attempts, however,
cannot be viewed as acquiescence to the executive privilege claim.68 Con-
gress simply recognized that "there may be subjects on which [the Execu-
tive Branch] should not be forced to testify. 69
Proponents of the executive privilege rely upon the foregoing historical
instances of presidential claims of an inherent right to withhold informa-
tion to establish a constitutional right by usage.7" However, the "constitu-
tionality of executive action, absent express constitutional authorization,
can be established. . . only if it is 'systematic, unbroken, executive prac-
tice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before ques-
tioned.' ,,71 History has shown that presidential claims of an inherent
right to withhold have been rare and the instances of congressional acqui-
escence have been infrequent.7 2
III. WATERGATE
A. Judicial Proceedings
The claim of executive privilege was a critical issue in the Watergate
investigations. One basis for President Nixon's refusal to comply with the
grand jury's subpoena was his belief that a President had absolute immu-
nity from the compulsory process of the courts.7 3 The President recog-
nized the court's ability to issue subpoenas, but he believed the court
lacked the authority to command presidential obedience to subpoenas.7 4
Judge Sirica dismissed the President's contention and ordered him to re-
lease the subpoenaed tapes to the court for an in camera inspection.7 5
Judge Sirica could find no reason to suspend the court's power to obtain
evidence relating to criminal activity simply because the President was
col. 3.
68. Gard, supra note 9, at 819.
69. S. REP. No. 2507, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1954).
70. Gard, supra note 9, at 819.
71. Id. at 820 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
72. Gard, supra note 9, at 819.
73. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973). The President explained that
he would "follow the example of a long line of ... [his] predecessors as President of the
United States who have consistently adhered to the position that the President is not sub-
ject to compulsory process from the courts." Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 7. Chief Justice Marshall's decision in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694), recognized a difference between issuing and ordering compli-
ance with a subpoena, but the distinction did not pertain to judicial power or jurisdiction.
Compliance, according to Marshall, required weighing the President's reasons for confidenti-
ality. The President was to be shown deference in this weighing, but the court was to make
the ultimate decision. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 709-11 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
75. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
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the person who had the evidence.78 It is a well established principle, wrote
Sirica, that "the grand jury has a right to every man's evidence."77 The
character of the evidence, not the character of the possessor, is the deter-
mining factor in deciding the propriety of introducing evidence.7 Both
the President and the special prosecutor challenged Judge Sirica's order:
the President because it required him to release the tapes to the judge;
the special prosecutor because the order did not require full and immedi-
ate disclosure of the tapes to the grand jury and did not provide the spe-
cial prosecutor with access to the tapes for in camera inspection. 9 The
court responded by requiring the district judge to inspect the subpoenaed
evidence and determine what evidence, if any, should be disclosed to the
grand jury. 0 The court of appeals did not address an issue unanswered in
United States v. Burr: the right of opposing counsel to full disclosure
prior to judicial determination of relevancy." ' The court took the oppor-
tunity to reaffirm that it is the province of the judiciary, not the execu-
tive, to determine the scope of the executive privilege.8 2
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in United States v. Nixon"s ad-
dressed the President's need for confidentiality in communications with
advisors.8 4 The Court concluded that this need for confidentiality was
"too plain to require further discussion."8 " Surprisingly, the need for
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id. at 6.
78. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
79. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 721. In its opinion, the court of appeals outlined the steps to be followed on
remand:
Following the in camera hearing and inspection, the District Court may determine
as to any items (a) to allow the particular claim of privilege in full; (b) to order dis-
closure to the grand jury of all or a segment of the item or items; or, when segmenta-
tion is impossible, (c) to fashion a complete statement for the grand jury of those
portions of an item that bear on possible criminality. The District Court shall provide
a reasonable stay to allow the President an opportunity to appeal. In case of an ap-
peal to this Court of an order either allowing or refusing disclosure, this Court will
provide for sealed records and confidentiality in presentation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
81. See Nathanson, From Watergate to Marbury v. Madison: Some Reflections on Presi-
dential Privilege in Current Historical Perspectives, 16 Amz. L. REv. 59, 66 (1974).
82. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 713.
83. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
84. Id. at 705.
85. Id. Confidentiality is necessary to encourage open and candid discussions between the
President and his advisors and to allow them the freedom to explore alternatives that often
would not be expressed if it were known that the ideas would be made public. Id. at 708. In
recognizing confidentiality as a source of an executive privilege claim, the Court followed
Justice Marshall's ruling in United States v. Burr. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text. See also Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324-26 (D.D.C.
1926) (confidentiality allows the frank expression and discussion that is essential to the
functioning of the government).
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presidential confidentiality was found to be derived from the separation
of powers doctrine."s Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that there was
no explicit reference to any confidentiality privilege in the Constitution.87
Nevertheless, he decided that "to the extent [confidentiality] relates to
the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally
based."88 The Court established that this need for confidentiality flows
from the President's powers under article II of the Constitution.""
Although the Court was willing to recognize a need for confidentiality,
it was not willing to recognize an absolute executive privilege:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidenti-
ality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute,
unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under
all circumstances .... [T]he very important interest in confidentiality of
Presidential communications is [not] significantly diminished by production
of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a dis-
trict court will be obliged to provide.90
The Court felt that reading into article II an absolute executive privilege
based on a general claim of preserving confidentiality in presidential com-
munications, when a subpoena is issued for evidence in a criminal matter
would disrupt the balance of power and the courts' ability to perform
their article III duties.91 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that confi-
dentiality justifies only a "presumptive privilege."92
United States v. Nixon also marked the adoption by the Supreme
Court of a balancing test to determine the validity of an executive privi-
lege claim. 3 The test requires weighing "the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in perform-
ance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privi-
lege on the fair administration of criminal justice. 94 The Court con-
cluded that when a specific need for subpoenaed evidence is balanced
86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705. The opinion stated, "Whatever the nature of
the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. I1 pow-
ers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own
assigned area of constitutional duties." Id.
87. Id. at 711.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 705.
90. Id. at 706.
91. Id. at 707.
92. Id. at 708. This presumptive privilege calls for the courts to give the President's claim
for withholding information great deference when assessing whether disclosure is appropri-
ate. See id.
93. Id. at 711-12.
94. Id. (footnote omitted). In using this balancing test, the Court was concerned only with
the President's interest in confidentiality and the need for relevant evidence in criminal
trials. The Court was not concerned with balancing the confidentiality interest and congres-
sional demands for information. Id. at 712 n.19.
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against a presumptive privilege, "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege
must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.
5
The Supreme Court's balancing test has both strengths and weak-
nesses. One strength of the test lies in its flexibility.96 Balancing allows
the needs of the executive and judiciary to be considered on a case-by-
case basis.9 7 This is certainly more desirable than a hard and fast rule
either recognizing or denying an absolute privilege. Another strength of
the test is the incorporation of the President's presumptive privilege
which conforms to the separation of powers doctrine by showing defer-
ence to the executive branch.9
s
The chief weakness of the test is in its mechanical application. 9 Before
the Court balances, the party seeking the information must comply with
the evidentiary requirements for obtaining a subpoena, such as showing
relevance and materiality.0 0 If the President then invokes the executive
privilege, the party must overcome the President's presumptive privi-
lege. 10 1 This is often difficult because meeting the evidentiary require-
ments usually exhausts the party's knowledge of the requested informa-
tion.1 0 2 An additional weakness lies in the judge's ability to balance.10 3
The test presumes that the judge will be in a position to realistically
weigh the importance to the President of confidentiality against the im-
portance to the public of the prosecution of wrongdoers.,,"
B. Legislative Proceedings
Executive privilege may be asserted not only against the judiciary, but
also against the legislature. During the Watergate investigations, the
95. Id. at 713. The grand jury's desire for the subpoenaed tapes arose from (1) contradic-
tory testimony of witnesses on matters likely to be of great importance to a trial on the
merits, Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 718, and (2) the substantial probability that the privi-
lege was being used as a shield for criminal wrongdoing. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F.
Supp. at 12. President Nixon showed very little justification for his confidentiality claim. He
stated that he would not invoke the executive privilege if there were suspicion of miscon-
duct. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717. In addition, presidential advisors had already testified
about the tapes, so they were no longer confidential. Id. at 718. The court of appeals also
applied the balancing test and found for the grand jury. Id. at 716-18.
96. Note, supra note 1, at 426.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 427.
103. Nathanson, supra note 81, at 74.
104. Id.
1983] 213
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
courts were called upon for the first time 0 5 to determine the executive's
power to withhold information from Congress. 10 6 The first suit of the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities1 0 7 against
President Nixon'018 was dismissed upon jurisdictional grounds after Judge
Sirica ruled that none of the existing statutes authorized a federal court
to consider a Senate committee's action to enforce a subpoena.10 9 Con-
gress responded to Judge Sirica's ruling by enacting a statute which
vested such jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. ° The Senate Select Committee did not, however, fare much better
in the second suit in the district court which was begun after the statute's
enactment. Judge Gesell, writing for the court, stated that the balancing
test was applicable, but he did not use it."' Instead, the decision was
based on the effects which disclosure of the subpoenaed material might
have on the pending criminal trial." 2 Because disclosure might result in
an undue risk of prejudicial pre-trial publicity, the court dismissed the
suit without ruling on the underlying question of privilege." 3 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's ruling because the committee failed
to show that th6 subpoenaed evidence was "demonstrably critical to the
responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions.""' 4 The suit was dis-
105. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51
(D.D.C. 1973), was a case of first impression. See Gard, supra note 9 at 811 n.11.
106. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
107. The committee was empowered to investigate "illegal, improper or unethical activi-
ties" occurring in connection with the presidential campaign and election in 1972 and "to
determine ... the necessity or desirability of new congressional legislation to safeguard the
electoral process by which the President of the United States is chosen." Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(a) (1973)).
108. The suit arose because President Nixon failed to comply with the committee sub-
poena for the Watergate tapes. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v.
Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 53-55 (D.D.C. 1973).
109. Id. at 61. The Senate Select Committee attempted to use 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which
compels an officer of the United States to perform his duties, as a basis for jurisdiction.
Judge Sirica said that there was nothing in the Constitution that makes it an official duty of
the President to comply with a congressional subpoena. 366 F. Supp. at 57. He noted that
the President's "obligation to produce unprivileged evidence was 'more akin to a ministerial
duty' than to a discretionary one, 'if indeed it concerns official duties at all.' "Id. at 57 n.13
(quoting In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 8 n.21 (D.D.C. 1973)) (emphasis added
by Sirica, J.).
110. Pub. L. No. 93-190, 87 Stat. 736 (1973) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)).
111. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp.
521, 522 (D.D.C. 1974). The court attempted to extend the balancing test to deal with mat-
ters involving presidential confidentiality and congressional demands for information.
112. Id. at 523.
113. Id. at 524.
114. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d at 731.
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missed prior to the balancing test stage.115 Altogether, the three decisions
afford little insight into the executive's power to withhold information
from Congress.
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY HEARINGS
A. Background
In 1980, Congress created a "Superfund" for cleaning hazardous waste
sites. 6 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the
money and authority to purge these sites.1 7 Criticism of the EPA's ad-
ministration of Superfund prompted two congressional subcommittees to
"investigat[e] charges that the EPA had made 'sweetheart' deals with
polluting companies and delayed cleanup for political reasons."118 Both
subcommittees issued subpoenas to the EPA's administrator, Anne Gor-
such Burford,119 requesting documents relating to the utilization of the
Superfund.1 20 President Reagan invoked the executive privilege in re-
sponse to these subpoenas and directed Mrs. Burford to refrain from re-
leasing the requested documents.1 21 Her refusal to comply with the sub-
poenas prompted the House of Representatives, in an unprecedented act,
to cite her for contempt of Congress. 22 After the contempt citation, the
Justice Department filed a suit asking the federal district court to declare
the House subpoenas unconstitutional because the documents were pro-
The court gave two reasons for its decision: (1) The committee's oversight needs for the
tapes were merely cumulative since the House Committee on the Judiciary already had the
tapes and had begun impeachment proceedings, and (2) the task of legislating does not
require exact information relating to witnesses' testimony. Id. at 732.
115. The balancing test is used only after the party seeking information has successfully
rebutted the President's presumptive privilege. See Berger, How the Privilege for Govern-
mental Information Met Its Watergate, 25 CASE W. REs. 747, 782 (1975). Here, the Senate
Select Committee was not successful in its rebuttal. See supra note 108.
116. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9615 (Supp. V 1981))
[hereinafter cited as Superfund].
117. Superfund, supra note 116, § 9615.
118. Superfund, Supermess, Tihm, Feb. 21, 1983, at 14.
119. Anne Gorsuch Burford was married during these hearings. Hereinafter she will be
referred to as Mrs. Burford.
120. The House Public Works Oversight Subcommittee had been investigating the EPA's
handling of Superfund for several months and on October 14, 1982, issued a subpoena for
documents relating to cleanup efforts at 160 Superfund sites. The House Oversight and In-
vestigations Subcommittee was investigating charges by EPA officials that the agency was
withholding a $6.1 million grant to clean Stringfellow, a California site, until after the No-
vember congressional election to prevent Governor Jerry Brown from taking credit for the
cleanup in his Senate campaign. The subcommittee issued a subpoena on November 22,
1982, for information pertaining to the charges. Superfund, Supermess, supra note 118, at
14-15.
121. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
122. Id.
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tected by the executive privilege and because the subcommittees failed to
demonstrate a specific need for the documents. 123 The court dismissed
the suit and urged the President and Congress to compromise.' After
allegations of wrongdoing were made against the EPA, 12 5 President Rea-
gan abandoned his claim of executive privilege and released all of the
subpoenaed documents to the House subcommittees.'26
B. The Executive Privilege Claim
When President Reagan invoked the executive privilege to withhold
"enforcement sensitive" documents from Congress,"17 he was extending
the scope of any executive privilege previously invoked. In United States
v. Nixon, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a presumptive
privilege for materials used in advising the President."' Here, however,
the EPA's "enforcement sensitive" documents were neither prepared for
the President nor viewed by him before he invoked the privilege.2 9
The President advanced the arguments of sensitivity and interference
with pending agency investigations as justifications for withholding the
documents."3° While sensitivity may justify secrecy from the public, it
does not justify secrecy from Congress."' Congress' article I, section 5,
clause 2 powers under the Constitution insure the confidentiality of clas-
sified information.'1 2 An executive privilege claim based on interference
with pending agency investigations could be raised at any point in con-
gressional investigations;"'3 such claims, however, would severely hamper
123. Id.
124. Id., Feb. 6, 1983, § 4, at 7, col. 4.
125. See Extra! Extra! Shredder Update, TIME, Feb. 28, 1983, at 17 (allegations that
EPA employees shredded subpoenaed documents and assistant administrator Rita Lavelle
violated conflict-of-interest laws).
126. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 4.
127. Id., Feb. 17, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 6 (the documents were "enforcement sensitive"
because they discussed strategy against specific companies and would hinder cleanup
efforts).
128. 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
129. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 1. The documents included information
pertaining to the government attorneys' analysis of weaknesses in their own cases, lists of
witnesses, figures on how the EPA would be willing to settle cases, and names of informers.
Id., Feb. 18, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 6. The documents also contained a memo written by a law
clerk in connection with "federal and California laws regarding the settlement of civil tort
actions" and form letters sent to companies informing them of a meeting with the EPA to
discuss liabilities. Anderson, EPA Documents May Not Mean A Trip to Jail, Wash. Post,
Jan. 31, 1983, § C, at 23, col. 4.
130. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1983, § A, at 1, col. 6.
131. Gard, supra note 9, at 834.
132. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
133. See Morrison, Executive Privilege Has Its Place, Wall St. J., May 27, 1983, at 22,
col. 4 (argument of inhibiting investigations could also be made for fraud claims involving
defense contractors, ABSCAM-like investigations, and espionage).
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Congress' exercise of its article I powers.' 3 '
President Reagan's voluntary release of the subpoenaed documents to
Congress cannot be taken as implying an abandonment of the claim of
executive privilege to withhold enforcement sensitive documents. The
President relinquished this particular claim of executive privilege to
avoid any suspicion that it was being used to shield wrongdoing at the
EPA.'3 5 The claim of executive privilege for enforcement sensitive docu-
ments was not disavowed; rather, its use was foreclosed by allegations of
wrongdoing.
C. The Judiciary's Role
When the federal district court dismissed the Justice Department's
suit, it failed to decide one of the issues courts have historically claimed
to be within their jurisdiction - the scope of the executive privilege.1" 6
The court's action showed its preference for political rather than judicial
determination of the rights and privileges of the executive and legislative
branches. 137
Many reasons have been advanced for the court's hands-off approach.
One is that it has never been the function of the judiciary to define "the
rights and privileges of the Congress and President inter sese in the legis-
lative process.""8 Rather, the judiciary's familiar role is that of determin-
ing the executive's legal obligations. 139 Another reason is that the court's
experience lies in weighing the need for specific evidence in judicial pro-
ceedings, not in weighing Congress' legislative needs against the public
interest in maintaining presidential confidentiality. 40 Furthermore, con-
gressional demands for information are so numerous that any limitation
would hamper Congress' powers under article I.'41
Resolving disputes through the political process would allow Congress
to use its authority to deny appropriations in order to compel the produc-
tion of information from the executive branch.14 2 With the enormous in-
crease in the size of the executive branch, "there is little risk of legislative
134. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
135. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 6.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43, 49-50. By failing to determine whether the
executive privilege applied to enforcement sensitive documents, the court avoided answering
questions such as: (1) What is the definition of "enforcement sensitive"? (2) If the executive
privilege does apply to these documents, is it a presumptive privilege? (3) Is the balancing
test to be applied?
137. See supra text accompanying note 124.
138. Cox, supra note 26, at 1425.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1425-26.
141. Id. at 1426.
142. Nathanson, supra note 81, at 77.
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tyranny over the Executive."' 4 However, there is a great capacity for
congressional harassment and abuse. Multiple congressional committees
have oversight authority over one executive agency.144 If an executive
agency had to comply with every request for information from every con-
gressional committee, the agency might spend more time responding to
requests than performing its administrative duties. Congress does not
need every piece of information to formulate legislation; fact finding
should be directed toward predicting consequences of possible legislation,
not reconstructing past events. 145 Moreover, the executive branch and the
legislative branch are frequently controlled by different political parties.
Thus, Congress may have motives other than legislating when it demands
information from the executive. The power struggle between the two
branches requires judicial mediation.
There is also a constitutional obstacle which must be overcome before
the political process can be allowed to determine the use of the executive
privilege in a civil suit.146 In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court
observed that the executive privilege was "constitutionally based" to the
extent that it was related to "the effective discharge of a President's pow-
ers.' 47 If these phrases imply that the executive privilege "is secured by
the Constitution" and inferred from the President's article II powers, 48
then the judicial branch, not the legislative branch, must determine the
applicability of the executive privilege.' 49 However, the words of article II
and the language of the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon are not
decisive on this point.15 0 Chief Justice Burger used the phrase "constitu-
tionally based," not "constitutionally secured" or "guaranteed by the
Constitution."1 5 His choice of words was not random.' 52 The opinion also
contained the phrase "rooted in the separation of powers under the Con-
stitution.''5 Moreover, the assertion that the executive privilege is "con-
stitutionally based" is qualified by the phrase "to the extent this interest
relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers." 54 Congress
may often authorize actions that affect the President's discharge of his
143. Cox, supra note 26, at 1433.
144. Storm Over the Environment, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1983, at 16, 17 (44 congressional
committees have oversight authority over the EPA).
145. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
146. Cox, supra note 26, at 1434.
147. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
148. Cox, supra note 26, at 1434.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1435.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
154. Id. at 711.
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powers, as, for example, those involving appropriations. 15 5 It is possible
that "the Supreme Court, if squarely confronted with the question, might
M~56explain away the assertions in United States v. Nixon ....
The EPA hearings really shed no new light on the executive's power to
withhold information from Congress. It remains to be seen how long the
power struggle between the executive branch and the legislative branch
will continue before the courts decide the location of the authority which
will determine the validity and scope of the executive privilege when the
President and Congress are the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
History and the Constitution do not support the use of an executive
privilege to justify withholding information from Congress and the courts.
In fact, quite the contrary appears to be true. The courts and Congress
have the power to demand information from the President.
157
"[T]he claim of executive privilege [seems to be] simply an unwar-
ranted attempt to aggrandize the power of the Executive Branch."' 58 The
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Nixon established that
when the President asserts the executive privilege against judicial de-
mands for information, the judiciary will always prevail.
However, the power struggle between the executive and legislative
branches continues. The courts' decisions in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon and the EPA hearings do not
resolve the issues of the scope and validity of the executive privilege when
the privilege is asserted in response to congressional demands for infor-
mation. The intense power struggle seen in the EPA hearings indicates
that the judiciary, not the political process, must ultimately decide who
has the authority to determine the scope and validity of the executive
privilege when Congress and the President disagree.
Jean M. D'Ovidio
155. Cox, supra note 26, at 1435.
156. Id. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
157. Gard, supra note 9, at 835.
158. Id.
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